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Abstract 
The DoD is a large, bureaucratic, rule-intensive organization that may not be 
suited well for its environment. Building upon prior research of acquisition centralization 
and knowledge dynamics, we employ computational methods to assess the behavior 
and performance of different organizational designs in varying environments. Our 
results reinforce Contingency Theory and suggest particular characteristics of different 
acquisition environments make one organizational form relatively more or less 
appropriate than another. Practically, answers to our research questions have direct 
and immediate application to acquisition leaders and policy makers. Theoretically, we 
generalize to broad classes of organizations and prescribe a novel set of organizational 
design guides. 
Keywords: Computational Organizational Theory, VDT, project simulation, 
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Executive Summary 
The DoD is a large, bureaucratic, rule-intensive organization that may not be 
suited well for its environment. Building upon prior research on acquisition centralization 
and knowledge dynamics, we employ computational methods to assess the behavior 
and performance of different organizational designs in varying environments. In this 
study, we use the VDT modeling environment to represent and emulate the behavior of 
an acquisition organization. We then conceptualize and model two alternate acquisition 
organizations, manipulating key factors of their organizational designs.  We subject 
them to two environmental contexts, routine and stressed, comparing their performance 
in terms of cost, schedule and risk. In routine circumstances, our experimental 
decentralized and holon-type organizations out-perform typical hierarchies in measures 
of cost and schedule.  Under high stress from task uncertainty, noise, and error 
probability, our decentralized and holon-type organizations completed their same 
project work volume as well, faster, and for less cost than their centralized counterpart.  
In both environments, however, our less formal organization structures yield a higher 
project-quality risk. Our findings are similar to those of other VDT researchers who find 
the relationship between organizational performance improvements and increasing 
project risk from decentralization in environments of uncertainty (Kim & Burton, 2002) 
and worker knowledge (Nissen & Buettner, 2004).  They offer an extension of 
Contingency Theory to include risk as a dependent variable for organizational structures 
and project outcomes. Our results reveal the same relational patterns of performance 
capabilities among the three organizational designs and across differing stress 
environments.  They underscore complex interactions between organizational design 
factors, and suggest fundamental tension and decision tradeoffs between important 
performance measures such as project cost, schedule and quality/risk.  As such, they 
reinforce Contingency Theory and suggest particular characteristics of different 
acquisition environments that make one form relatively more or less appropriate than 
another. The results provide several implications for managerial practices and 
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structure and performance.  Perhaps for the first time—or at least to an extent 
unachievable heretofore—we show how managers can gain fundamental insights into 
the inherent project tradeoffs in advance of making project decisions. Understanding 
when the bureaucracy is relatively beneficial and how this rigid organizational form can 
negatively influence project cost (and positively impact project risk) is important for 
acquisition practitioners today.  The apparent implications are that adopting a 
decentralized structure in accordance with contingency theory may not lead to higher 
unit performance, since it might instead produce poorer project quality.  But it is 
insufficient to only assume that more bureaucracy alleviates risk with attendant costs, or 
that managers must simply choose either fast and cheap, or better quality results. Our 
work begins to shape a new hypothesis: that perhaps there is an optimal organizational 
design solution, relative to cost, duration and risk. If managers can ascertain early on 
the criticality (and tolerable level) of project-quality risk, they can perhaps select along a 
continuum the level of organizational hierarchy and centralization needed to control 
project outcomes.  Or, reframing the question, how much will added bureaucracy cost to 
alleviate risk? Practically, answers to our research questions have direct and immediate 
application to acquisition leaders and policy makers. Theoretically, we generalize to 
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Introduction 
Acquisition is big business. The US Department of Defense (DoD) alone routinely 
executes eleven-figure budgets for research, development, procurement and support of 
weapon systems, for instance. Acquisition is also a rule-intensive business. In addition 
to myriad laws governing federal acquisition in the US, a plethora of regulations 
specify—in great detail often—how to accomplish the planning, review, execution and 
oversight of Government acquisition programs, large and small, sole-source and 
competitive, military and commercial (Dillard, 2003). Due in great part to the large size 
and many rules associated with Defense acquisition in particular, the organizations 
responsible for DoD acquisition activities tend to be large and rule-intensive 
themselves—reflecting the kinds of centralized, formalized, specialized and oversight-
intensive forms that correspond to the classic Machine Bureaucracy from Organization 
Theory (e.g., see Mintzberg, 1979). The problem is this classic organizational structure 
is known well to be exceptionally poor at responding to change. In the context of military 
transformation, such a problem should be clear and compelling. Arguably, one or more 
superior organizational approaches must be available to replace the current acquisition 
organization. But which, if any, is most appropriate? On what basis should acquisition 
leaders and policy makers choose between competing organizational forms? What 
evidence supports claims of superiority for one organizational approach versus 
another? Questions such as these are difficult to answer through most research 
methods employed today to study acquisition organizations (e.g., case study, survey, 
action). 
The bureaucratic nature of the DoD Acquisition Organization did not emerge 
recently, nor did it materialize by design. Rather, it reflects the cumulative accretion of 
laws, regulations, rules and hierarchical levels over considerable time. If only the 
organization could be changed and evaluated—say through assessment of four 
alternate organizational structures—then one could assess the relative performance of 
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toward the best performer. But, clearly the set of problems and actors in the changed 
organizations would differ from those associated with the original and with one another; 
that is, there is no way to impose controls over such a study (e.g., internal validity is 
compromised). This is one reason why so many acquisition research projects produce 
so little new knowledge. Alternatively, such controls can be imposed easily through 
laboratory experimentation. Yet, the simplified nature and laboratory context of 
experiments fail to capture the size, scope and complexity of the acquisition 
organization (e.g., external validity is compromised). This is another reason why so 
many acquisition research projects produce so little new knowledge. However, by 
combining the best features of laboratory experimentation (e.g., experimental controls) 
with field methods (e.g., large-scale and complex behaviors), one can design and 
conduct a study of acquisition organizations that reflects both internal and external 
validity.  
This is the approach of computational experimentation: using sophisticated and 
validated computer models of organizations to assess the behavior and performance of 
different organizational designs. Computational Organization Theory (COT; see Carley 
& Prietula, 1994) provides a set of methods and tools to enable this approach. In 
particular, using the methods and tools associated with the Virtual Design Team (VDT) 
Research Group at Stanford, computational models of organizations are driven by well-
accepted organization theory and are validated by extensive and repeated field studies. 
This validation provides considerable confidence that computational results reflect the 
likely behaviors and performance of the acquisition organizations they model and 
emulate. 
The research described in this article involves the application of VDT methods 
and tools to study acquisition organizations. In particular, we model and simulate the 
behavior of organizations associated with major defense acquisition programs in the 
DoD. We provide both answers to and insights into how such organizations can be 
changed to improve performance. Some of the key organizational design variables of 
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research to investigate centralization (Dillard, 2003). For instance, factors such as 
centralization, formalization, specialization, hierarchical layers and the like can be 
manipulated—individually as well as in combination—under controlled and replicated 
conditions to assess the performance of acquisition organizations in different forms. 
This follows recent, complementary research using computational organization theory in 
the domain of military command and control (Nissen & Buettner, 2004; Nissen, 2005a, 
b). Considerations such as the number, frequency and level of acquisition reviews, 
adaptability and flexibility of acquisition organizations, and risk-versus-project-duration 
of acquisition programs are primary in this study. The key research question is: How 
can organizations responsible for major acquisition programs be redesigned to improve 
performance?  
The significance of this approach is twofold. First, answers to the research 
question have direct and immediate application to acquisition leaders and policy 
makers. Such answers address a serious and immediate problem, revealing insights 
into the behaviors of major acquisition organizations that are too complex and dynamic 
to be understood well or directly. They illuminate the kinds of changes acquisition 
organizations can make to balance competing performance measures (e.g., adaptability 
& flexibility vs. project risk & duration). They can explain—in a theoretically grounded 
manner—many different cases of acquisition success as well as failure. They can also 
provide overarching theory to help promote the former and obviate the latter in future 
acquisition programs. 
Second, this research project demonstrates the efficacy of a new approach to 
studying acquisition organizations. It enables leaders, policy makers and analysts to 
answer “how much” questions such as: How much centralization, formalization and 
specialization is best? What fraction of commercial off-the-shelf equipment would be 
ideal? What level of concurrency between development and production provides the 
best combination of cost, schedule, performance and risk? Such questions are not 
answered well today in terms of acquisition organizations. This leaves acquisition 
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The balance of the article begins with a focused review of the literature relevant 
to this study. We follow with discussion of our research design and description of the 
computation model developed to represent and emulate the acquisition organization. 
The article turns then to discuss results of our computational experiments. Conclusions, 
implications and recommendations for future research close the article, along with a rich 
set of references for deeper exploration into the research on which this article builds 
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Background 
This focused review of the literature relevant to our study is organized into three 
parts: 1) the acquisition organization, 2) organization theory, and 3) computational 
experimentation. 
The Acquisition Organization 
Of particular interest to the authors is the realm of DoD program management, 
where research and development dollars are expended to invent or advance warfighting 
capability.  While US weaponry is considered some of the best in the world, the major 
acquisition projects to acquire them are often fraught with cost and schedule growth. 
They even fail at times to meet specifications or to provide the capabilities desired.  
Since implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act legislation in the late 1980s, major 
defense acquisition organizations (e.g., program management offices) have operated 
under a four-tiered decision structure. 
For major acquisitions, the current policy makes clear that the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is the Milestone Decision Authority 
responsible for the overall program:  Described in the DODI 5000.1: 
3.4 The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) is the designated individual with overall 
responsibility for a program.  The MDA shall have the authority to approve entry of an 
acquisition program into the next phase of the acquisition process and shall be 
accountable for cost, schedule, and performance reporting to higher authority, including 
Congressional reporting. (USD(AT&L), 2003) 
And three levels down the hierarchy, Program Managers (PMs) are described as:  
3.5.1 the designated individual with responsibility for and authority to accomplish 
program objectives for development, production, and sustainment to meet the user's 
operational needs.  The PM shall be accountable for credible cost, schedule, and 
performance reporting to the MDA. (USD(AT&L), 2003) 
Thus, the Program Manager and Milestone Decision Authority share responsibility for 
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4.3.1.1 There is no one best way to structure an acquisition program to accomplish the 
objective of the Defense Acquisition System. MDAs and PMs shall tailor program 
strategies and oversight, including documentation of program information, acquisition 
phases, the timing and scope of decision reviews and decision levels to fit the particular 
conditions of that program, consistent with applicable laws and regulations and the time-
sensitivity of the capability need. (USD(AT&L), 2003) 
However, while the wording above might indicate that the MDA and PM plan 
jointly or collaborate in some way on program strategy, there are, in fact, both a 
Component Acquisition Executive and Program Executive Officer in the hierarchy 
between them, and direct communication between MDA and PM is infrequent. The four 
tiers of major program command and control and typical grade/ranks of positions are 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. DoD Decision Hierarchy for Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(adapted from DAU, 2004) 
MDA PMs lead Program Management Offices (PMOs).  PMOs vary greatly in 
size. A typical range of government-assigned workers is generally between 50 and 100 
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government agency players, multi-tier industry contractors, and other participants can 
multiply this figure many times (Dillard, 2004).  While all stakeholders represent different 
parts of the enterprise, here we refer to this central government organizational entity—
the government PMO—as the acquisition organization. 
At the PMO level, several alternatives for the organization exist.  In most cases, 
the offices are comprised of permanently assigned “core” personnel, and temporarily 
assigned co-located “matrix” personnel on loan from commodity systems commands.  
These are personnel typically arrayed by functional area within the PMO (as shown in 
Figure 2). A significant number of on-site support contract personnel may be present as 
well. 
 
Figure 2. Typical, Matrixed Program Management Office Structure  
(adapted from DAU, 2004) 
Somewhat less formally, programs also organize internally in ad hoc teams 
oriented on specific areas of each project. This stems largely from DoD initiatives over 
the last 10 years to implement Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) 
using Integrated Product Teams (IPT).  This management philosophy emphasizes the 
potential of collective knowledge via small organizations with cross-functional or multi-
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philosophy of work implementation and problem solving are also embodied and 
magnified in emerging thought regarding command and control (C2) in tactical military 
organizations. The text Power to the Edge recognizes the benefit of using information-
age technology to transfer knowledge and power to the point of an organization’s 
interaction with its environment (Alberts & Hayes, 2003). 
 
Figure 3. Example (Aircraft) PMO IPT Structure  
(adapted from DAU, 2004) 
 
Another concept pertinent to our introduction is that of work and organizational 
hierarchy.  Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon argues, from his observation of 
complexity in things both natural and artificial, that complex systems evolve from simple 
systems. And they do so more rapidly when there are stable, intermediate forms or sub-
systems (like modules or “units of action”).  Moreover, he argues the resulting evolution 
into the complex system will be hierarchic, including systems such as organizations 
(Simon, 1981).  But an important observation is also made by Koestler, who studies 
hierarchies in social organizations. He notes that sub-systems exist only as entities 
relative to their positions in the hierarchy.  He proposes the word “holon” to describe the 
hybrid nature of individual organizations within larger organizations/systems. Holons are 
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are also dependent parts of the larger hierarchy (or “holarchy,” as Koestler termed 
structures consisting of them). He views holons as autonomous, self-reliant units which 
have their own independence, and which cope with contingencies without asking higher 
authorities for instructions. Yet, they remain subordinate ultimately, subject to control 
from higher authorities.  The term seems somewhat analogous to edge in the 
conceptualization of Edge organizations (Alberts & Hayes, 2003).  Such concepts of unit 
knowledge, empowerment and relative autonomy within organizational structures are 
key to our design of various organizations for experimentation.  
Organization Theory 
Classic organization theory holds that organizational structures must change in 
response to contingencies of size, technology, environment and other factors.  Indeed, it 
is accepted widely that, when faced with uncertainty (a situation with less information 
than is needed), the appropriate management response should be either to redesign the 
organization for the task at hand or to improve information flows and processing 
(Galbraith, 1973).  Van Creveld (1985) applies this same principle to command and 
control of combat elements in war. He argues that the command structure must either 
create a greater demand for information (vertically, horizontally, or both) and increase 
the size and complexity of the directing organization, or it must enable the local forces 
to deal semi-independently with the situation.  His central theme is that decentralized 
control is the superior method of dealing with uncertainty, whether with the task at hand 
or with transformation of the organization itself.  Research by Van de Ven and Delbecq 
(1986) has shown further that as complexity and uncertainty increase, hierarchical 
management control and vertical communication strategies are considered inferior to 
less formal organizations with horizontal communication channels.  
Another classical concept of organizational theory is Ashby’s Law of Requisite 
Variety (Ashby, 1960). This states loosely that, in order to cope with the variety of 
challenges imposed by it, the internal capabilities of a system must be as diverse as 
those required by its environment.  Organizational evolution and survival are dependent 
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unpredictable.  Ashby’s Law suggests, too, that the organization’s structure and control 
strategy must be matched to its environment to enhance performance. Open and 
flexible management styles and processes are required often for dynamic market and 
technological conditions.  Further, research by Burrell and Morgan (Morgan, 1997) 
indicates that any incongruence among management processes and the organization’s 
environment tend to reduce organizational effectiveness.   
What the cumulative research appears to support is that, for large, complex 
hierarchies such as the Department of Defense—which operate in today’s environment 
of program complexity, evolving requirements, and rapidly changing technology—
decentralized control and empowerment should be an organizational strength. 
Notwithstanding such cumulative research, however, organizational hierarchies persist 
(Leavitt, 2004). Indeed, for DoD acquisition in particular, the command structure has 
remained relatively stable since the late 1980s.  Although the current command 
structure is arguably flatter and more streamlined now than it was in the 1970s and 
before, it remains fundamentally hierarchical, centralized and rule-driven. Only through 
the major reform initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s did the acquisition organization’s 
“chain of command” become as streamlined as it now is (Packard Commission, 1986).   
Computational Experimentation 
Drawing heavily from Nissen and Buettner (2004), we assert that throughout the 
era of modern science, a chasm has persisted between laboratory and field research. 
On one side, the laboratory provides unparalleled opportunity for controlled 
experimentation. Through experimentation, the researcher can manipulate only a few 
variables of interest at a time and can minimize the confounding associated with the 
myriad factors affecting complex systems and processes in the field (Box et al., 1978; 
Johnson & Wichern, 1992). However, limitations of laboratory experimentation are 
known well (Campbell & Stanley, 1973) and are particularly severe in the domain of 
acquisition. In acquisition experimentation, such limitations center on problems with 
external validity. Laboratory conditions can seldom replicate the complexity, scope and 
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also include problems with generalizability. Many experiments utilize samples of 
convenience (esp. university students) instead of working professionals. This practice 
calls into question how closely the associated experimental results are representative of 
acquisition behavior in operational organizations. These same concerns pertain also to 
analytical methods (e.g., mathematical analysis, optimization; see Chiang, 1984; Lapin, 
1985). Most such methods use theoretical concepts as variables, not operationalized 
constructs. And, of course, analytical models do not involve real people, systems and 
organizations. 
On the other side, field research provides unparalleled opportunity for realism 
(Denzin &, Lincoln, 1994). The researcher in the field can study full-scale artifacts in 
operational environments (Yin, 1994) and can minimize the abstraction away from 
working people, systems and organizations (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). However, 
limitations of field research are also known well (Campbell & Stanley, 1973) and are 
particularly severe in the acquisition domain. In acquisition field research, such 
limitations center on problems with internal validity. Field research affords little 
opportunity for controlled experimentation (cf. Cook & Campbell, 1979). Also, 
confounding data often results from the myriad influences on complex systems and 
organizations that cannot be isolated in the field. This diversity makes it difficult to 
identify and trace the causes of differential behaviors—better as well as worse—in 
acquisition. 
As implied by the name, computational experiments are conducted via computer 
simulation. As such, they offer all of the cost and time advantages of computational 
analysis. But, computational experiments go beyond most simulations. Rigorous 
experimental designs are employed to capture the benefits of laboratory 
experimentation. The variables affecting physical systems and organizations in the field 
can be isolated and examined under controlled conditions. This type of analysis also 
addresses the internal validity and confounding limitations of field research. Yet, 
computational experiments can be conducted at a fraction of the cost and time required 
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external validation, computational models can demonstrate fidelity emulation of the key 
qualitative and quantitative behaviors of the physical systems and organizations they 
represent. This ability addresses the problems with external validity and generalizability 
noted above.  
It is important to note: computational modeling and simulation are not new 
techniques for the study of acquisition.  For instance, a major DoD initiative called 
simulation-based acquisition has sought to educate the workforce about modeling and 
simulation (DSMC, 1998). And DoD policy has called for extensive use of modeling and 
simulation techniques in program planning and execution (Gansler, 1998). But, 
simulation-based acquisition has suffered to date from problems with internal and 
external validity alike. Such problems are not inherent to simulation methods or tools 
per se. Rather, they stem from models lacking theoretically rooted behaviors, externally 
validated results, and experimental controls. Our approach to computational 
experimentation obviates such problems deliberately. 
Figure 4 illustrates the essential elements of computational experimentation as a 
research method. The top of the figure includes a shape to depict the bridge metaphor 
associated with this method, as it spans a wide gap between laboratory and field 
methods. From the left side of this “bridge,” two arrows represent inputs to describe the 
behaviors of computational models. Organization theory, which is predicated upon 
many thousands of studies over the last half century, provides the basis for most such 
behaviors. Behaviors pertaining to organizational factors such as centralization, division 
of labor, task interdependence, function, coordination, formalization, technology and 
information processing from organization theory are captured well. Where extant theory 
does not address well a behavior of interest (e.g., knowledge flows), ethnographic and 
like immersive field studies (Bernard, 1998) are conducted to understand the associated 
organizational behaviors. Because organization theory is general and not based on any 
single organization, the associated behaviors have broad applicability across 
organizations in practice. This provides for the generalizability attainable through the 
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Figure 4. Bridge Method  
(adapted from Nissen & Buettner, 2004) 
From the bottom of the “bridge,” an arrow represents the use of computer models 
to represent organizations and to emulate their key behaviors. Some variety exists in 
terms of specific implementations, but most computer models adhere to standards, 
norms and conventions associated with the COT field. The central goal is to develop 
computer models that emulate the key behaviors of organizations and to use such 
models to examine alternate methods of organization and coordination. As such, COT 
shares with acquisition a focus on many factors of importance. 
From the right side of the “bridge” in the figure, one arrow represents a 
requirement in our approach for model validation. Through validation, the organizational 
behaviors emulated by computer models are examined and compared with those of 
operational organizations in the field. We view this comparison as essential, for it 
provides confidence that the behaviors emulated by the computer model have sufficient 
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This provides for the external validity attainable through computational experimentation. 
It is important to note, not all COT models are subjected to such validation. Many 
researchers use computational models to conduct theorem-proving studies, which are 
valuable in their own right to demonstrate various aspects of organization theory. But 
without validation, researchers have difficulty making claims that such theory mirrors the 
behavior of organizations in the field. Hence, validation represents an important 
characteristic of distinguishing computational experimentation (as the research method 
described specifically in this article) from COT in general. 
Finally, from the top of the “bridge,” an arrow represents the use of experimental 
controls in research. Following the same, rich set of experimental designs available to 
laboratory researchers (e.g., full-factorial, Latin Squares, blocking with replication), 
computational experimentation as a research method can be used to control myriad 
factors and to manipulate just one or a few variables at a time (e.g., searching for 
causality relations). Further, the same experimental design and setup can be replicated 
any number of times—for instance, using Monte Carlo techniques or other 
computational approaches to introduce variation. This provides for the internal validity 
attainable through computational experimentation. The combination of these “bridge” 
inputs—organization theory and ethnography, computer models, validation and 
control—allows the method of computational experimentation to be understood in terms 
of, and to indeed inherit, the various properties of its constituent elements. 
Figure 4 illustrates also the bridging nature of computational experimentation as 
a research method. On the left side, we depict analytical and laboratory methods and 
we summarize their key advantages (e.g., low-cost & fast studies, good experimental 
control & internal validity) and disadvantages (e.g., poor external validity & 
generalizability). On the right side, we depict field methods in similar fashion to 
summarize their key advantages (e.g., good external validity & generalizability) and 
disadvantages (e.g., high cost & time consuming, poor experimental control & internal 
validity). Notice from their relative advantages and disadvantages how the two classes 
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where analytical and laboratory methods are weak, and vice versa. As an alternate 
research method, computational experimentation mitigates weakness of both classes. 
For instance, it enables good experimental control and internal validity as in laboratory 
methods. It also promotes good generalizability and external validity as in field methods.  
Nonetheless, every research method is flawed in some respects. In our present 
case, when used in isolation, computational experimentation is not as good as either 
method at its best. For instance, because computational experimentation uses 
computer models of people in organizations instead of real people, it is weaker in this 
respect than laboratory experimentation is. This same use of computer models instead 
of real people also makes computational experimentation weaker than field methods 
are. This is why we describe computational experimentation as a bridge method: it 
bridges the chasm between experimental and field research methods; yet, it serves best 
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Research Design 
This discussion of the research design is organized into three parts: 1) agent-
based modeling environment, 2) computational acquisition organization model, and 3) 
experimental design. 
Agent-Based Modeling Environment 
In this section, we build upon current advances in VDT research to describe the 
agent-based modeling environment used here for computational experimentation. 
Drawing heavily from Nissen and Levitt (2004), we first summarize the stream of 
research associated with VDT and then describe its modeling environment. 
Virtual Design Team Research 
The VDT Research Program (VDT, 2004) reflects the planned accumulation of 
collaborative research over two decades to develop rich theory-based models of 
organizational processes. Using an agent-based representation (Cohen, 1992; Kunz et 
al., 1998), micro-level organizational behaviors have been researched and formalized to 
reflect well-accepted organization theory (Levitt et al., 1999). Extensive empirical 
validation projects (e.g., Christiansen, 1993; Thomsen, 1998) have demonstrated 
representational fidelity and have shown how the emulated behaviors of VDT 
computational models correspond closely with a diversity of enterprise processes in 
practice.  
The VDT research program continues with the goal of developing new micro-
organization theory and of embedding it in software tools that can be used to design 
organizations in the same way that engineers design bridges, semiconductors or 
airplanes: through computational modeling, analysis and evaluation of multiple, 
alternate prototype systems. Clearly, this represents a significant challenge in the 
domain of organizations. Micro-theory and analysis tools for designing bridges and 
airplanes rest on well-understood principles of physics (e.g., involving continuous 
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measure and calibrate), and analysis of such physical systems yields easily to 
differential equations and precise numerical computing.  
In contrast, theories describing the behavior of organizations are characterized 
by nominal and ordinal variables, with poor measurement reproducibility, and verbal 
descriptions reflecting significant ambiguity. Unlike the mathematically representable 
and analyzable micro-behaviors of physical systems, the dynamics of organizations are 
influenced by a variety of social, technical and cultural factors, are difficult to verify 
experimentally, and are not as amenable to numerical representation, mathematical 
analysis or precise measurement. Moreover, quite distinct from physical systems, 
people and social interactions—not molecules and physical forces—drive the behavior 
of organizations. Hence, such behaviors are fundamentally non-deterministic and 
difficult to predict at the individual level. Thus, people, organizations and business 
processes are qualitatively different from bridges, semiconductors and airplanes. And it 
is irrational to expect the former to ever be as understandable, analyzable or predictable 
as the latter. This represents a fundamental limitation of the approach. 
Within the constraints of this limitation, however, we can still take great strides 
beyond relying upon informal and ambiguous, natural-language textual description of 
organizational behavior (e.g., the bulk of extant theory). For instance, the domain of 
organization theory is imbued with a rich, time-tested collection of micro-theories that 
lend themselves to qualitative representation and analysis. Examples include 
Galbraith's (1977) information-processing abstraction, March and Simon’s (1958) 
bounded rationality assumption, and Thompson’s (1967) task-interdependence 
contingencies. Drawing from this theory base, we employ symbolic (i.e., non-numeric) 
representation and reasoning techniques from established research on artificial 
intelligence to develop computational models of theoretical phenomena. Once 
formalized through a computational model, the symbolic representation is “executable,” 
meaning it can emulate the dynamics of organizational behaviors. 
Even though the representation is qualitative (e.g., lacking the precision offered 
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semi-formal (e.g., different people viewing the model can agree on what it describes), 
reliable (e.g., the same sets of organizational conditions and environmental factors 
generate the same sets of behaviors), and explicit (e.g., much ambiguity inherent in 
natural language is obviated). Particularly when used in conjunction with the descriptive 
natural language theory of our extant literature, this represents a substantial advance. 
Further, once a model has been validated to emulate accurately the qualitative 
behaviors of the field organization it represents, it can be used to examine a multitude of 
cases (e.g., many more and diverse than observable in practice) under controlled 
conditions (e.g., repeating the same events multiple times, manipulating only one or a 
few variables at a time through repeated trials, stopping the action for interpretation). 
These features alone offer great promise in terms of theory development and testing. 
Additionally, although organizations are inherently less understandable, 
analyzable and predictable than physical systems are, and the behavior of people is 
non-deterministic and difficult to model at the individual level, it is known well that 
individual differences tend to average out when aggregated cross-sectionally and/or 
longitudinally. Thus, when modeling aggregations of people in the organizational 
context (e.g., work groups, departments, firms), one can augment, with certain aspects 
of numerical representation, the kind of symbolic model from above. For instance, the 
distribution of skill levels in an organization can be approximated—in aggregate—by a 
Bell Curve; the probability of a given task incurring exceptions and requiring rework can 
be specified—organization wide—by a distribution; and the unpredictable attention of a 
worker to any particular activity or event (e.g., new work task, communication, request 
for assistance) can be modeled—stochastically—to approximate collective behavior. As 
another instance, specific organizational behaviors can be simulated hundreds of 
times—such as through Monte Carlo techniques—to gain insight into which results are 
common and expected versus those that are rare and exceptional. 
Of course, applying numerical simulation techniques to organizations is nothing 
new (e.g., see Law & Kelton, 1991). But this approach enables us to integrate the kinds 
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aggregate dynamics generated through discrete-event simulation. It is through such 
integration of qualitative and quantitative models—bolstered by strong reliance upon 
well-established theory and commitment to empirical validation—that our approach 
diverges most from extant research methods and offers new insight into the dynamics of 
organizational behavior.  
VDT Modeling Environment 
Here we provide a brief overview of the VDT modeling environment. The 
development and evolution of VDT has been described in considerable detail elsewhere 
(e.g., Cohen, 1992; Christiansen, 1993; Jin & Levitt, 1996; Thomsen, 1998; Kunz et al., 
1998; Levitt et al., 1999; Nogueira, 2000; VDT, 2004), so we do not repeat such 
discussion here. The VDT modeling environment has been developed directly from 
Galbraith’s information-processing view of organizations. This information-processing 
view has two key implications (Jin & Levitt, 1996). The first is ontological: we model 
knowledge work through interactions of tasks to be performed, actors communicating 
with one another and performing tasks, and an organization structure that defines 
actors’ roles and that constrains their behaviors. In essence, this amounts to overlaying 
the task structure on the organization structure and to developing computational agents 
with various capabilities to emulate the behaviors of organizational actors performing 
work. 
Figure 5 illustrates this view of tasks, actors and organization structure. As 
suggested by the figure, we model the organization structure as a network of reporting 
relations which can capture micro-behaviors such as managerial attention, span of 
control and empowerment. We represent the task structure as a separate network of 
activities, which can capture organizational attributes such as expected duration, 
complexity and required skills. Within the organization structure, we further model 
various roles (e.g., marketing analyst, design engineer, manager), which can capture 
organizational attributes such as skills possessed, level of experience and task 
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interdependencies and quality/rework loops—which can capture considerable variety in 
terms of how knowledge work is organized and performed.  
As suggested also by the figure, each actor within the intertwined organization 
and task structures has a queue of information tasks to be performed (e.g., assigned 
work activities, messages from other actors, meetings to attend) and a queue of 
information outputs (e.g., completed work products, communications to other actors, 
requests for assistance). Each actor also processes such tasks according to how well 
the actor’s skill set matches those required for a given activity, the relative priority of the 
task, the actor’s work backlog (i.e., queue length), and how many interruptions divert the 
actor’s attention from the task at hand. Collective task performance is constrained 
further by the number of individual actors assigned to each task, the magnitude of the 
task, and both scheduled (e.g., work breaks, ends of shifts, weekends and holidays) 
and unscheduled (e.g., awaiting managerial decisions, awaiting work or information 
inputs from others, performing rework) downtime. 
Communications






Figure 5. VDT Information Processing View of Knowledge Work  
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The second implication is computational: both primary work (e.g., planning, 
design, management) and coordination work (e.g., group tasks, meetings, joint problem 
solving) are modeled in terms of work volume. This construct is used to represent a unit 
of work (e.g., associated with a task, a meeting, a communication) within the task 
structure. In addition to symbolic execution of VDT models (e.g., qualitatively assessing 
skill mismatches, task-concurrency difficulties, decentralization effects) through micro-
behaviors derived from organization theory, the discrete-event simulation engine 
enables (virtual) process performance to be assessed (e.g., quantitatively projecting 
task duration, cost, rework, process quality).  
Clearly, quantitative simulation places additional burden on the modeler in terms 
of validating the representation of a knowledge-work process, which generally requires 
fieldwork to study an organization in action. The VDT modeling environment benefits 
from extensive fieldwork in many diverse enterprise domains (e.g., power-plant 
construction and offshore drilling, see Christiansen, 1993; aerospace, see Thomsen, 
1998; software development, see Nogueira, 2000; healthcare, see Cheng & Levitt, 
2001; others). Through the process of “backcasting”—predicting known organizational 
outcomes using only information that was available at the beginning of a project—VDT 
models of operational enterprises in practice have demonstrated dozens of times that 
emulated organizational behaviors and results correspond qualitatively and 
quantitatively to their actual counterparts in the field (Kunz et al., 1998).  
Viewing VDT as a validated model of project-oriented knowledge work, 
researchers have begun to use this dynamic modeling environment as a “virtual 
organizational testbench” to explore a variety of organizational questions, such as 
effects of distance on performance (Wong & Burton, 2000) or to replicate classic 
empirical findings (Carroll & Burton, 2000). Thus, the VDT modeling environment has 
been validated repeatedly and longitudinally as representative of both organization 
theory and enterprises in practice. This gives us considerable confidence in its results. 
Moreover, VDT is designed specifically to model the kinds of knowledge work and 
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Computational Acquisition Organizational Model 
In our experimental efforts, we use the VDT modeling environment to represent 
work associated with a three-tier acquisition organization. This follows our discussion 
above, and it is representative of many DoD service-level environments today (e.g., 
where several project offices report into one program executive “Portfolio Manager” and 
then up to a Component Acquisition Executive, and often into yet another level of 
decision-making).  VDT is capable of modeling large, complex, operational 
organizations in great detail; it has been demonstrated repeatedly to emulate well the 
associated behaviors of organizations in the field. But, using a high-level model as such 
helps us to maintain the focus of this expository article on techniques of VDT modeling 
and computational experimentation (which represents one of our primary contributions), 
and not to get lost in the details of the organization itself. We first describe the VDT 
representation and then illustrate how a full-factorial computational experiment can be 
performed upon it. 
VDT Acquisition Model 
Figure 6 presents a screenshot of the VDT acquisition program model. The 
model is comprised of five developmental system acquisition projects (i.e., denoted as 
lightly colored boxes).  Both concurrent and sequential projects/tasks are depicted in the 
model, and interdependencies are represented among them.  The model depicts a 
simple and abbreviated series of coordinated research and development efforts which 
are aligned to deliver an Advanced Strike capability integrated into a mobile platform 
and, subsequently, are enhanced with an evolutionary block of capability.  It is but a 
representative subset of what could be a larger, more complex, and more detailed 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 25- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Figure 6. VDT Acquisition Model Screenshot 
The coordination links (i.e., denoted by light dashed lines) connecting the 
coordinated tasks or projects denote reciprocal task interdependencies (Thompson, 
1967), which suggest they must be coordinated closely in both planning and execution. 
For example, integration of strike capabilities into a mobile platform requires 
coordination among engineers for interface and configuration control of hardware, 
software, and other factors. VDT emulates the added coordination effort associated with 
such reciprocal task interdependencies. The rework links (i.e., denoted by dark dashed 
lines) connecting tasks from different mission phases denote sequential task 
dependencies, which suggest the predecessor activities must be accomplished 
effectively in order for the successors to perform well. Strike and Mobility 
Enhancements, for instance, depend heavily upon success of the Initial Strike and 
Mobility Platform efforts. To the extent that such predecessor work is not completed or 
not accomplished effectively, certain aspects may have to be reanalyzed to correct any 
major deficiencies. 
The people icons depict organizations and are arranged in terms of the 
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more human resources, specified in Full Time Equivalents (FTEs), which have particular 
capabilities, skill levels and roles. Where a skilled actor’s capability matches that 
required for an acquisition task, the resource is likely to perform it competently and 
within the time required. If the actor has greater or lesser skill, the time required to 
perform the task can be appreciably shorter or longer, and the competency of 
performance can be notably better or worse, respectively. Where an actor does not 
possess the required capability at all, the task will be in jeopardy. Such relationships are 
appealing intuitively and reflect well many organizational behaviors. 
A Senior Executive actor sits atop the acquisition organization model and has a 
Portfolio Manager reporting to it.  Reporting to the Portfolio Manager are five individual 
PMOs (01 through 05) with different roles and capabilities within them.  For example, 
the icon labeled “PM 02” is responsible for the technological enhancement of the initial 
Strike Capability. Notice the VDT representation includes a work task structure and an 
organization structure. The assignment links (i.e., delineated by solid lines) denote 
which organizational actors are responsible for the various work tasks. Finally, a dark 
trapezoid box is used to depict recurring meetings (e.g., coordination meetings, 
technical reviews, milestone reviews) that must be attended by the actors connected by 
links. Meetings consume actors’ resources, but they also contribute toward 
coordination.  
All of the structural elements (e.g., work tasks, requirements and 
interdependencies, actor capabilities, skill levels and roles, organization structure, task 
structure and meeting requirements) of this VDT model are developed by the authors. 
Such structural elements would clearly be different for each unique organization and 
process model. VDT also includes several dozen environmental variables with “normal” 
values determined empirically by prior field research. These include factors such as the 
level of uncertainty and noise associated with a project, the inherent propensity of an 
organization to make errors, and relative concern for performance quality associated 
with actors at different levels of organizational hierarchy. These and other 
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different organizations and contexts. Other factors can be changed to reflect different 
organizational designs. For instance, the level of centralization and formalization can be 
varied by changing design variables. The corresponding VDT model behaviors have 
been developed empirically. We capitalize upon such empirically developed behaviors 
to design and compare new acquisition organization models and subject them to 
changing environments. 
VDT also includes several performance variables for comparison. In addition to 
standard simulation measures such as project duration and cost, VDT also includes 
measures such as levels of rework, coordination and delay, in addition to risk measures 
keyed to various attributes of importance (e.g., tasks left undone, missed 
communications, project-level errors). Some of these performance variables are 
correlated often with one another, whereas others highlight tradeoffs that must be 
made. In other words, where a project is running behind schedule but on budget, a 
leader or manager can decide to employ more resources. This often has the effect of 
increasing the rate of progress while also increasing the rate of expenditure. Other 
tradeoffs such as those between cost and risk or schedule and coordination require 
balance in a similar fashion. It is important to note again the extensive and longitudinal 
validation of VDT provides considerable confidence that the organizational behaviors 
emulated by our computational model will reflect well those of operational organizations 
in the field.  
Experimental Design 
As is appropriate for the cumulative accretion of knowledge through research, 
this study builds upon prior work using VDT methods and tools to examine alternate 
organizational designs and environmental conditions. For instance, Kim and Burton 
(2002) use VDT to model projects with varying levels of task uncertainty and 
centralization, measuring the effects on cost, schedule and risk as dependent 
performance variables. They find a relationship between organizational structure and 
performance. And they examine project risk, measuring the likelihood that outputs from 
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The study calls attention to the impact of centralized control on organizational 
performance in light of task uncertainty. It also suggests that managers should pay 
attention to such aspects of organizational structure and should consider the importance 
of project quality in addition to profitability alone. In another instance, Nissen and 
Buettner (2004) use VDT to model command and control in military missions. They 
model organizations having varying levels of bureaucracy, coordination and knowledge, 
measuring the effects on mission duration and risk as dependent performance 
variables.  They find a similar relationship between organizational structure and task 
performance and overall risk, and they suggest that organizational leaders must choose 
and balance the performance measures that are most relevant to the project’s 
environment and desired outcomes.  
In this study, we emulate the behaviors of three different modeled organizations 
which vary in degrees of hierarchy, centralization and formalization, and which are 
subjected to different levels of environmental stress. Briefly, our three designs of 
organizations have the same amount of work volume to perform, with the same level of 
team experience and individual skills involved.  What differs among them is their degree 
of autonomy and empowerment, specified by several VDT constructs.  Therefore, we 
build upon the kinds of prior research noted above, and we extend such prior research 
to address the acquisition domain. We also extend prior research through the greater 
number and variety of organizational design changes and degrees of environmental 
stress examined in this study. 
Figure 7 reflects today’s acquisition organization (labeled “Typical”) with high 
centralization, formalization and three layers of decision hierarchy, somewhat like an 
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Figure 7. Typical Acquisition Organization Design and Project Work 
In contrast to the typical organization, Figures 8 and 9 depict two alternate 
organizations with fewer layers of decision hierarchy and lower centralization and 
formalization.  The first organization (labeled “Decentralized”) has less hierarchy and 
control overhead in its management structure.  Note the removal of the “Senior 
Executive” position in the representation, whose VDT role of PM has been delegated 
lower to the Portfolio Manager, now labeled as “Leader.”  As in reality, the supervision 
structure in the VDT model is an exception-handling hierarchy.  It is the chain of 
command for information and decision about problems discovered in the course of a 
project.  Positions of PM 01, 02, and others still act within the VDT simulation as 
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Figure 8. Decentralized Organizational Design and Project Work 
The second organization, depicted in Figure 9 (labeled “Holonistic”) has no 
overhead management structure at all.  Here, each PM position in the figure remains 
designated a Subteam Leader within the VDT tool. The various PMs communicate with 
one another directly. Table 1 shows the VDT settings for organizational parameters to 
be tested.  Additional modeling detail on organizational design parameters is found in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 1. Organizational Design Parameters 
 
Environmental stress is applied to our three organizational designs via the VDT 
constructs requirement complexity, solution complexity, and task uncertainty 
(appropriate to environments that project offices often face with technology maturity, 
interoperability requirements, etc.) as well as higher noise (distractions) and increasing 
functional- and project-error probabilities.  For the experiment, each of these three 
factors is specified at two levels: routine and stressed, shown in Table 2 below. Hence, 
a full-factorial design consists of six trials (i.e., three alternate organizational designs x 2 
different environmental conditions), which we designate according to the levels 
corresponding to a set of environmental factors.  Additional modeling detail on 
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Table 2. Environmental Parameters 
 
We examine the dependent variables of particular interest in the acquisition 
domain: cost, schedule duration and project risk. We also make note of the maximum 
position backlog, rework volume, coordination volume, and decision wait time, as these 
have implications for managers to consider.  Schedule is important to project managers, 
and time is often viewed as money because of the staff that must be paid as long as 
they are retained—whether productive to the project or not.  Project cost is measured in 
$K, and pertains to staffing costs only, as no material costs are modeled in our 
experiment. Project risk, as mentioned above, is represented as the likelihood of an 
incomplete project outcome, which relates directly to project quality.  While every task 
within a project may not be critical to project quality, more tasks incomplete or defective 
place the overall project at risk for failure.  Where lives are at stake, such as in new 
pharmaceutical compounds, new passenger aircraft, or defense weapon systems 
involving lethality and survivability, overall project risk may be a difficult trade for 
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Experimental Results 
In this section, we report on the results of our computational experiment.  
Summarized in Table 3 is each of the six trials in this full-factorial experiment.  The table 
includes measures for project cost, schedule and risk, in addition to other metrics that 
can provide insight into organizational dynamics (rework volume, coordination volume 
and decision wait).  
Table 3. Experimental Results 
 
Examining these results, we see that the baseline organization—the Typical 
Organization in Routine environment—completes the series of projects in 556 days, at a 
cost of $8,085 (K), with a project risk index of 0.41.  While these are the three primary 
success measures of any project, the VDT simulation provides more insight in terms of 
position backlog (e.g., one actor got 26 days behind in work at one point during the 
project).  The tool can also identify when this occurs so that planners can split tasks or 
assign more resources for specific tasks. Work volume refers to the amount of effort 
expected to complete all project tasks under ideal conditions (e.g., no noise, errors or 
miscommunications). Rework Volume refers to the simulated time needed for all 
positions on a project to perform required rework.  Coordination volume is the 
cumulative time positions spend during a project processing information requests from 
each other, attending meetings, and other coordinative tasks.  Decision Wait measures 
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These values for our baseline case provide a basis for comparison with results for 
alternate organizational designs and environmental conditions. 
Comparing these results with those obtained by the Decentralized and Holonistic 
Organizations in the Routine environment, key differences are apparent.  Decentralized 
and Holonistic organizations fare considerably better (in terms of both cost and 
schedule) in the routine environment than their more Typical counterpart organizational 
design does.  Program schedule or duration is reduced some 23% (from 556 to 428 
days) with the Decentralized Organization and 27% (from 556 to 407 days) by changing 
organizational structure toward a more Holonistic design.  Program cost is reduced 
similarly by 42% (from $8085 (K) to $4674 (K)) with Decentralized and 44% (from $8085 
(K) to $4565 (K)) with Holonistic in the successive design iterations.  However, project 
risk increases appreciably in both alternate organizations, going up to 54% and then to 
76%, respectively, in Decentralized and Holonistic designs.  Here, we find that 
Decentralized and Holonistic organizational forms offer a combination of advantages 
(e.g., shorter schedule duration, lower cost) and disadvantages (e.g., higher risk) with 
respect to the Typical acquisition organization in a routine environment. 
Upon examination of these organizational designs under stress environments, 
we find the Typical Organization suffers cost and schedule growth in the 4-5% range 
(i.e., 580 days, $8561 (K)), with a slight decline in project risk (0.37).  Decentralized and 
Holonistic organizations under stress perform better in the cost realm with 22% ($6708 
(K)) and 42% ($4973 (K)) reductions compared with the Typical. The Decentralized 
design reveals longer schedule duration (604 vs. 580 days), but the Holonistic 
organization shows a 21% decrease (458 vs. 580 days).  Again, project risk climbs in 
stress environments to 55% for Decentralized and to 76% for the Holonistic. 
Figure 10 illustrates graphically the dynamic relationship we find between cost 
and organizational design. Notice, in the routine environment, project cost decreases 
abruptly with a shift from a Typical to a Decentralized organizational form. But, 
negligible additional improvement accrues to the Holonistic design. Alternatively, in the 
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does, and the Holonistic organization performs better still. Notice also how costs are 
higher for every organizational form in the stressed environment than they are in the 
routine one.  
 
Figure 10. Relationship between Cost and Organizational Design 
Figure 11 illustrates the relationship between risk and organizational design. 
Here, we observe a monotonic increase in risk corresponding to progression in 
organizational form from Typical, through Decentralized, to Holonistic. As costs 
decrease across these alternate organizational forms, risk increases in lock step. Unlike 
the cost results, however, the stressed environment appears to exert little influence in 
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Figure 11. Relationship between Risk and Organizational Design 
Interpreting these results, the researchers found that the less centralized, 
formalized and hierarchical organizational designs perform better in terms of cost and 
schedule than other designs, but with accompanying project-quality risk.  Interpreting 
these results further, in which schedule and cost are of primary concern to all project 
managers, decentralized control (especially in stressed environments) may provide a 
more cost-effective approach. Alternatively, where project risk or quality is paramount, 
formalized procedures, vertical information flows, and centralized decision-making 
typical of bureaucratic organizational forms can be seen as superior.  This reflects a 
fundamental tradeoff between performance measures and organizational design, as 
conceptualized generally in terms of Contingency Theory (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967).  
And as Kim and Burton (2002) noted, the theory is actually extended by the evidence of 
risk coming into play with a more rapid and inexpensive project solution afforded by 
empowered actors with relevant information at their organizational edge.   
The DoD, like sponsors of projects in the FDA’s pharmaceutical arena and in the 
FAA’s commercial aviation arena, is averse generally to risk due to the safety and 
survivability aspects of many of its developmental systems. Indeed, the modeling here 
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correlating to estimated program dollar thresholds (stratification of acquisition categories 
I though IV) as a means of addressing cost risk.  However, and just as important to 
illustrate, high levels of bureaucracy place considerable stress on acquisition 
organizations and come at their own cost.  Are 40% program cost growth and 25% 
schedule growth commensurate with 20 – 50% program risk reduction?  Might a 
commensurate amount of risk be alleviated through less-expensive means?  Clearly, 
tools such as VDT provide a new way of gaining insights into these important program 
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Conclusion 
The DoD is a large, bureaucratic, rule-intensive organization that may not be 
suited well for its environment. Building upon prior research on acquisition centralization 
and knowledge dynamics, we employ computational methods to assess the behavior 
and performance of different organizational designs in varying environments. Our 
results reinforce Contingency Theory and suggest particular characteristics of different 
acquisition environments that make one form relatively more or less appropriate than 
another. Practically, answers to our research questions have direct and immediate 
application to acquisition leaders and policy makers. Theoretically, we generalize to 
broad classes of organizations and prescribe a novel set of organizational design 
guides. 
In this study, we use the VDT modeling environment to represent and emulate 
the behavior of an acquisition organization. Although the Typical acquisition 
organization modeled in this study is representative of such organizations in practice, 
we do not claim to have experimented—even computationally—with an operational 
organization. Rather, we experiment computationally with a high-level organizational 
model, illustrating the method, use and utility of our approach for exposition. We then 
conceptualize and model two alternate acquisition organizations, manipulating key 
factors of their organizational designs.  We subject them to two environmental contexts, 
routine and stressed, comparing their performance in terms of cost, schedule and risk. 
In routine circumstances, our experimental decentralized and holon-type 
organizations out-perform typical hierarchies in measures of cost and schedule.  Under 
high stress from task uncertainty, noise, and error probability, our decentralized and 
holon-type organizations completed their same project work volume as well, faster, and 
for less cost than their centralized counterpart.  In both environments, however, our less 
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Our findings are similar to those of other VDT researchers who find the 
relationship between organizational performance improvements and increasing project 
risk from decentralization in environments of uncertainty (Kim & Burton, 2002) and 
worker knowledge (Nissen & Buettner, 2004).  They offer an extension of contingency 
theory to include risk as a dependent variable for organizational structures and project 
outcomes. Our results reveal the same relational patterns of performance capabilities 
among the three organizational designs and across differing stress environments.  They 
underscore complex interactions between organizational design factors, and suggest 
fundamental tension and decision tradeoffs between important performance measures 
such as project cost, schedule and quality/risk. 
The results provide several implications for managerial practices and application 
of organization theory regarding the relationships between organizational structure and 
performance.  Understanding when the bureaucracy is relatively beneficial and how this 
rigid organizational form can negatively influence project cost (and positively impact 
project risk) is important for acquisition practitioners today.  The apparent implications 
are that adopting a decentralized structure in accordance with contingency theory may 
not lead to higher unit performance, since it might instead produce poorer project 
quality.  But, we suspect it is insufficient to only assume that more bureaucracy 
alleviates risk with attendant costs, or that managers must simply choose either fast and 
cheap, or better quality results. 
In the early 1990’s, with a goal of shortening development times, reducing cost, 
and increasing numbers of scientific missions flown, NASA adopted a “Faster, Better, 
Cheaper” approach to project management.  This management philosophy was 
implemented in spite of an old project management adage that project managers could 
have any two of these performance outcomes, but not all three (Spear, 2000). This 
maxim is supported somewhat by the findings of Lin and Carley (1997) regarding 
decision accuracy in organizations under time pressure.  After the several unmanned 
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lives of seven astronauts, an analysis of NASA failures blamed a more risk-tolerant 
culture as an organizational cause of the accident. 
The DoD, having large complex systems with inherent risk of their own, is 
particularly averse to risk in its decision structure and perhaps even its organizational 
culture. With growing federal budget deficits and base re-alignments, it is also 
particularly cost-constrained. And with accelerating obsolescence rates of weapon 
system technology, the DoD remains under considerable pressure to reduce project 
schedules as well. Even with simple models, we show that project performance can be 
examined with various organizational designs and under differing environments. 
Perhaps for the first time—or at least to an extent unachievable heretofore—we show 
how managers can gain fundamental insights into the inherent project tradeoffs in 
advance of making project decisions. The practical significance should be apparent 
immediately. 
These experiments support propositions that information processing is a primary 
organizational activity and is associated with project cost and duration (i.e. the more 
information processing a project requires, the more costly and lengthy the project 
becomes).  Certainly, there is attendant benefit to the information processed as well.  
However, the additional measure of project-quality risk is critical for many types of 
projects, and its emerging relationship from these studies and our most recent work 
begin to shape a new hypothesis: that perhaps there is an optimal organizational design 
solution, relative to cost, duration and risk.  If managers can ascertain early on the 
criticality (and tolerable level) of project-quality risk, they can perhaps select along a 
continuum the level of organizational hierarchy and centralization needed to control 
project outcomes.  Or, reframing the question, how much will added bureaucracy cost to 
alleviate risk? The key point is: the answer will differ—necessarily—for every project. A 
one-size-fits-all acquisition policy is naïve given such knowledge and our ability to 
emulate organizational performance as illustrated in this article. 
Building upon the VDT constructs introduced in this article, one day researchers 
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speed vs. risk) and environment. Leaders, managers and researchers may develop the 
capability to design organizations, work processes and technologies using 
computational techniques comparable to those employed for designing airplanes, 
bridges and computers. That day is not yet here. But, through research along these 
lines, we can both foresee and accelerate its arrival.  Meanwhile, the centralized control 
that dominates current acquisition thinking and policy merits re-examination in light of 
this study. Such control imposes costs as well as accrues benefits. We know now how 
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Appendix A: Design of Organization Models 
This appendix provides additional detail about the design of our experimental 
acquisition organization models.  Table 1 above specifies design parameters and VDT 
simulation settings for all three of our organizational designs: Typical, Decentralized and 
Holonistic.  We reproduce the information below as Table 4 and discuss the various 
design parameters. 
Table 4. Organizational Design Parameters 
 
Our experiments simulate the acquisition efforts of five small project-
management offices oriented on an initial strike capability (such as one provided by a 
missile or direct-fire weapon), integration into a mobile platform (such as a ground or air 
vehicle), and followed by block enhancements to both sets of capability from insertion of 
technology.  These types of effort are common within program executive office portfolios 
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three different organizations with similar resources, but varying parameters of 
organizational control. 
Centralization, Formalization and Matrix Strength comprise a group of variables 
that work together in our modeling tool to characterize levels of bureaucratic 
organizational control. Low Centralization settings in the Decentralized and Holonistic 
models mean decisions are made by the individual responsible positions. Centralization 
reflects decision-making in the organization—either by senior project positions or by 
“decentralized” individuals. There is more communication required with High 
Centralization. Formalization measures how formal the communication is in an 
organization, with High Formalization meaning that communication tends to occur in 
formal meetings (despite the many informal communication occurring in any typical 
project office), and Low settings reflecting informal communication among positions. 
Matrix Strength characterizes the probability that workers will attend to exchanges of 
information—whether via meetings, communications about tasks, or noise. It conveys 
“connectedness” and can correspond to geographical collocation of workers. Typical 
major program acquisition organizations have workers and decision makers distributed 
across the country, and there is a greater need for meetings.  The Low setting for 
Typical acquisition organizations, however, reflects high meeting quality and 
complements High Formalization.  Conversely, High Matrix Strength, which 
complements Low Formalization, characterizes our flatter, more Decentralized or 
Holonistic organizations. In the “Typical” model, we use a three-level management 
hierarchy with two different full-time equivalents (FTE) in two management positions, 
acting as portfolio manager and senior executive.  We reduce to two, and then one in 
the other derivations.  The PM and SL designations beside their positions are VDT 
designations, which connote decision-making.  The 50 FTEs aside the Operations 
parameter represent project management office personnel in five distinct project work 
areas that are interdependent, and become more strengthened with communication 
links, used as such by the VDT.  In the Typical DoD acquisition organization, we have 
observed it is common for individual project offices within a PEO to communicate 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 51- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
(as evidenced in the model with Meetings).  We also reduce the number of meetings in 
the successively flatter organizational designs.  
Correspondingly, hierarchical communication is also depicted via a low setting 
(0.1) of Information Exchange Probability for the Typical Organization, growing much 
higher (0.9) in the flatter designs.  This is characteristic for a project involving mostly 
routine daily jobs performed by skilled workers (Typical design).  A higher value is given 
the designs with more highly interdependent tasks that are being performed by very 
busy workers.  A low setting of Application Experience for the Typical organization, and 
set at the entire program level, describes how many new R&D projects the positions 
may have worked on before, in spite of relative individual skill levels (which are all 
presumed as Medium and Matched to the work tasks assigned across all three 
designs).  The Decentralized and Holonistic organizations are envisioned as learning 
organizations, with the benefit of some Application Experience (set at Medium) in less 
complicated information processing and learning.  
Five Rework links connect all tasks in the Holonistic design, given the lack of an 
overhead hierarchy as an integrative function.  This is opposed to two links in the 
Decentralized and Typical designs.  Likewise, Rework Strength designations shift to 
reflect success/failure dependency as higher in the Decentralized and Holonistic, and 
lower in the Typical hierarchy, commensurate with associated task interdependency.  In 
much the same way, the stove-piped, independent efforts within the Typical 
organization hierarchy are represented in lower Functional and Project Error Probability 
settings.  Higher settings for the flatter organizational designs convey the challenge of 
integration and alignment they must face without an overarching control entity. 
The total simulated work task effort of all organizational designs is the same, 
except that layers of management in the Typical configuration have their own 
management tasks that run about 25% of the duration of the project’s planned timeline.  
The Team Experience value in the VDT tool affects the amount of information exchange 
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Team Experience for the work effort is set to Medium for all organizations, representing 
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Appendix B: Environmental Parameters 
This appendix provides additional detail about the environmental scenarios that 
our experimental acquisition organization models were subjected to.  Table 2 above 
specifies environmental parameters and VDT simulation settings for both of our 
environmental conditions: Routine and Stressed.  We reproduce the information below 
as Table 5 and discuss the various parameters. 
Table 5.  Environmental Parameters 
 
Requirement Complexity describes the degree of task complexity, which is 
relative to the total number of project requirements that the task must satisfy. 
Representative of current DoD acquisition environments are state-of-the-art 
technologies and interoperability requirements.  As such, there is a common 
environment of at least a Medium setting within our VDT tool for organizations under 
even routine circumstances.  An even more highly optimized design could have many 
tasks with a High Requirement Complexity, and is appropriate for our “stressed” 
settings.  
Solution Complexity represents the number of solutions to which a task 
contributes. The degree of complexity reflects the effect a task has on the tasks that 
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Uncertainty is a setting regarding the amount of communication across links 
needed for a task’s (and its dependent tasks’) completion. Task Uncertainty reflects the 
effect that other tasks can have on each other within the project. Task Coordination 
volume and the number of communications increase with higher uncertainty, so we 
selected “Medium” for routine and “High” for stressed environments. 
Noise Probability describes the interruptions or distractions that detract from work 
on project tasks. The probability of noise is set at 0.3 for our routine scenarios and 0.4 
for stressed.  
Functional Error Probability is the probability that a task will fail and require 
rework. Functional errors are localized to an individual task and, thus, only cause 
rework in that task.  Functional errors could be discovered via self-check, a project-
review meeting, or a supervisory review.  Depending on the level of centralization and 
hierarchy in the project, an exception can be handled by the responsible position or 
someone up the hierarchy. When a functional error is detected, an exception is sent to 
the responsible position or to a supervisor, generating either rework of the task, a quick 
fix, or feigned ignorance of the problem.  Project Error Probability is the probability that 
a task will fail and generate rework for all dependent tasks connected to it by rework 
links. The more rework links there are in a project, the more rework is generated by the 
exceptions that occur. We select 0.1 as our routine setting for the Typical organization 
and 0.2 for our Decentralized and Holonistic designs, reflecting their decreasing 
management potential for intervention.  For stressed scenarios, we use 0.3 for our 
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